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Abstract
We show and explain how generosity beyond that explainable by social prefer-
ences can manifest in bargaining. We analyze an ultimata game with two parties
vying to coalesce with a randomly chosen proposer. They simultaneously de-
mand shares of the surplus. The proposer must then make an offer that meets
at least one demand, or else the game either continues with a new round or
breaks down with all earning zero. Self-interest, altruism, and inequity aversion
univocally predict miniscule demands due to inter-party competition; proposers
thus obtain the lion’s share. We experimentally observe that proposers coalesce
with the less demanding party by strategically matching demands, like ultima-
tum bargaining, but also give non-strategically to the other party, like dictator
giving. The observations are incompatible with concave utilities, as implied by
social preferences, but are compatible with reference dependent preferences.
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1 Introduction
When interests are misaligned in groups, agreement may be reached through negoti-
ation. A common feature of many such contentions is the asymmetry of bargaining
power. The consequent exercise of power determines the extent to which the com-
peting interests of heterogeneous individuals in a group or diverse groups in society
are served, as is relevant in committees, directorial boards, and parliamentary negoti-
ations, for example. Social preferences such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Cox et al., 2007), fairness (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or
a combination of the two (Kohler, 2011; Tan and Bolle, 2006) have been proposed as
explanations for the under-realization of such power and for generosity to others in
settings such as dictator and ultimatum games. The purpose of this study is to investi-
gate the nature of generosity in bargaining that manifests without social preferences.
We do so by experimentally testing a specific “demand commitment” game of
majority bargaining. Demand commitments are known from parliamentary decision
making, where members of parliaments first state their demands on the motion to be
voted on (these “platforms” are formulated e.g. prior to elections and in parliamen-
tary debates), the respective committee then drafts a proposal to be moved by the
committee chair, and the parliament finally votes on it. The members of parliament
are assumed to commit to their demands and reject proposals that do not meet them,
in order to maintain their reputation. Thus, proposals are implemented if and only
if they satisfy the demands of a majority coalition. Modeling demand commitments
in political bargaining has been popularized by researchers such as Winter (1994a,b),
Cardona-Coll and Mancera (2000), and Montero and Vidal-Puga (2007, 2011). The
model analyzed here follows Vidal-Puga (2004) and Breitmoser (2009).
In our three-player ultimata game, two parties simultaneously make ultimatum
demands for their respective surplus shares. The proposer is then informed of these
ultimata, after which he proposes how to share the surplus. Proposals are imple-
mented if they satisfy at least one ultimatum (in the three-player majority game). The
proposer needs to satisfy only the lower of the two ultimata, offer the more demand-
ing player nothing, and retain the lion’s share. Knowing this, non-proposers should
competitively undercut each other by demanding less, a la Bertrand, until demands
are close to zero in equilibrium. Hence, competitive ultimata confer all the bargain-
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ing power to the proposer. The novelty of this model is the control that it imposes
on social preferences: as we show below, the same state of welfare asymmetry holds
true regardless of whether we assume self interest, linear altruism, or linear inequity
aversion. If preferences are non-linear, e.g. CES, positive demands can result in equi-
librium, but they should be moderate nonetheless, still leaving most of the cake to
the proposal maker. We experimentally test if this intuitively appealing, theoretically
robust, yet distributively lopsided state occurs in laboratory bargaining. If it does not
occur we can observe how and understand why.
Our use of a three-player format to control for social preferences by sharply re-
stricting their scope, rather than to test for the role of social motives by allowing
them, stands in contrast to the existing literature on (three-player) bargaining games.
Güth and van Damme (1998) test a three-player ultimatum game where only one of
two non-proposers has veto power. They find that generous offers are due to the
proposer’s fear of rejection rather than their sense of fairness, and that responders
reject low offers made to them not their fellow non-proposer. Güth et al. (1996) show
that when responders are put in the proposer role, even they try to exploit the other
responders by behaving deceitfully, indicating a lack of fairness concerns at the col-
legial level. In Kagel and Wolfe’s (2001) game, offers rejected by a randomly chosen
responder yields zero earnings for him and the proposer, and a consolation prize for
the responder. The fairness models of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) predict lower rejection rates in the treatment with consolation prizes,
because responders are averse to the inequity that arises between both responders
when one suffers from rejection and the other gets a consolation prize. Kagel and
Wolfe, however, find similar rejection rates in both treatments.
An alternative interpretation of the demand commitments that proposers have to
satisfy in order for proposals to be implemented in our game is borrowed from the ul-
timatum game of Poulsen and Tan (2007). There, proposers were allowed to “acquire
and use information” on responders’ minimum acceptable offer (i.e. demands) via
an option whereby offers would be automatically conditioned on demands. In their
game, responders effectively move first by setting the ultimata, with which money
maximizing proposers will comply, and thus have all the power. In contrast, when we
couple the freewill that our proposers have over the use of “acquired information” on
demands, together with the simultaneous and thus competitive ultimata, they possess
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all the power. Put differently, the strategic complementarity of competitive ultimata
increases the proposer’s equilibrium payoff because offers and demands are strategic
substitutes—social preferences regardless.
Our main results are as follows. Non-proposers demand for and are offered sub-
stantial shares. Proposers strategically satisfy the lower of two demands to avoid re-
jection, like ultimatum bargaining (Güth et al., 1982), but also give non-strategically
to the other party, like dictator giving (Forsythe et al., 1994). Unlike for dictator and
ultimatum games, however, neither self-interest nor social preferences can account
for generosity in the ultimata game. Our analysis shows that a non-concave model of
reference dependence, in the spirit of Shalev (2000, 2002), Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006,
2007), Butler (2008), and Ko˝szegi (2010), is compatible with the observations. Our
study offers evidence that accords with previous research supporting the relevance
of reference dependence in social interactions. Neilson (2006) theoretically shows
that inequity aversion is a special case of reference dependence in the sense that it
results if preferences are self-referently separable. The empirical relevance of social
reference points has been established in Dana et al. (2006, 2007), Andreoni and Bern-
heim (2009), and Bicchieri and Chavez (2010). Knez and Camerer (1995) show the
relevance of social comparisons in a three-player ultimatum game experiment where
asymmetric outside options to responders induced higher expectations, more rejec-
tions, and demands increasing with offers made to fellow responders.
Section 2 presents the game and analyzes it under assumptions of self-interest
and various forms of social preferences. Section 3 describes experimental design and
logistics. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 shows how they are compatible
with reference dependence preferences. Section 6 discusses and concludes.
2 The game
The game has three players, N = {1,2,3}, and proceeds in rounds. In each round,
a proposer is drawn randomly. Non-proposers state demands, and the proposer is
informed of the demands and states a proposal. If the proposal satisfies at least one
demand, then it is implemented. Otherwise a new round begins with probability .95,
and the game ends in disagreement (payoff being zero) with probability .05. In the
experiment, the subjects can allocate e 24 at a smallest currency unit of 1 Cent. The
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following theoretical analysis assumes that the smallest currency unit be 0, and the
set of feasible allocations therefore is, with C = 24,
X=
{
x ∈ RN | x≥ 0 and ∑i∈N xi ≤C
}
. (1)
The unique equilibrium demands are e 0 if players maximize pecuniary payoffs (as-
suming subgame perfection; for a related result, see Breitmoser, 2009). The proposer
therefore gets the whole cake e 24 (if the smallest currency unit is 1 Cent, the equi-
librium demands are e .02 or less rather than e 0 in general). Intuitively, the players
undercut each other’s demands in a way similar to Bertrand competition and they end
up demanding their marginal costs (which is zero).
Behavior in the respective one-shot game is theoretically very similar to that
in the infinite horizon game, as strategically the continuation payoffs are irrelevant
in view of the inter-party demand competition (and indeed, this holds true for all
outcome-based utility functions). By adopting the infinite horizon game, we implic-
itly allow for renegotiation after failing to reach an agreement and for uncertainty
of breakdown, because they mirror features found in real world bargaining. This is
common to many majority bargaining models including those without demand com-
mitment, e.g. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Harrington (1990). It also allows us to
test for stationarity, as further discussed next.
The following derives the equilibrium predictions if players have social prefer-
ences. Let their common utility function be U : RN → R (the symmetry assumption
simplifies the notation, but all our results generalize for appropriate adaptations of
notation). Here, U(xi,x−i) is the utility of i under the payoff profile (xi,x−i) ∈ RN .
Throughout, we assume that U is continuous in x ∈ RN , that it is symmetric in the
sense that changes of one’s opponents is irrelevant, U(xi,x j,xk) = U(xi,xk,x j), and
that all players would prefer to switch with better-earning opponents if everything
else is held constant,
∀x ∈ Rn : xi > x j ⇒ U(xi,x j,xk)>U(x j,xi,xk). (2)
For example, inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is described through
U(xi,x−i) = xi−α∑
j 6=i
max{x j− xi,0}−β∑
j 6=i
max{xi− x j,0}, (3)
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with 0 ≤ β ≤ α < 1/3. The value of α measures the degree of envy toward play-
ers that are better off than oneself, and the value of β measures the degree of guilt
towards players that are worse off than oneself. Fehr-Schmidt utilities are a special
case of what we call quasi-linear preferences: every player generally prefers getting
an additional dollar at the expense of his opponents. That is,
∀d > 0,∀α ∈ [0,1] : U(xi,x j,xk)<U
(
xi+d,x j−αd,xk− (1−α)d
)
. (4)
Further examples of preferences that are quasi-linear in this (rather weak) sense are
linear altruism, self-interest, and all non-linear preferences with sufficiently high elas-
ticities of substitution between own payoff and opponents’ payoffs. The alternative
range of circumstances with low elasticity of substitution is analyzed below.
Our first result characterizes the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria for
quasi-linear preferences. A subgame perfect equilibrium is stationary if all demands
and proposals are independent of the actions in previous rounds. Demands and pro-
posals may still depend on the identities i ∈ N of proposer and demanders in the
current round, and they may be asymmetric between players. The assumption of sta-
tionarity is not technically necessary, but it allows us to avoid the comparably tedious
discussion of how the continuation payoffs depend on the proposal if the demands are
prohibitive (in fact, it yields a simple definition of “prohibitive demands” in the first
place). We will say that demands are prohibitive if the proposer is best off satisfying
neither demand and settling for the continuation payoff.
Proposition 1 (Quasi-linear preferences). Assume the utility function is weakly con-
cave and quasi-linear (4). In all stationary SPEs, the demands satisfy di = 0 in all
subgames, and the proposer payoff is C.
Proof. Fix a stationary SPE and let (u˜1, u˜2, u˜3) denote the players’ expected utilities
in case agreement is not reached in the first round. By stationarity, these “continuation
utilities” are constant in all rounds. First, consider any subgame where a proposal has
to be made; let i ∈ N be the proposer, let j,k ∈ N be the other two players, and let
d j,dk be their current demands. In general, the utility maximizing proposal is of the
form (C−d− e,d,e) where
(d,e) ∈ argmax
(d′,e′)≥0
U(C−d′− e′,d′,e′) s.t. d′ ≥min{di,d j}.
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Under quasi-linearity (4), d = min{d j,dk} and e = 0 obtains. The demands (d j,dk)
are prohibitive if U(C−d∗,d∗,0)< u˜i with d∗ = min{d j,dk}.
Second, consider any subgame where demands have to be stated, and as above,
let i and j,k be proposer and demanders (respectively). Assume the equilibrium de-
mands are not prohibitive and denote them as (d j,dk). By quasi-linearity, U
(
d,0,C−
d
)
> U
(
0,d,C− d) for all d > 0, and by continuity, this implies that for all d > 0
there exists ε> 0 such that
U
(
d,0,C−d)> 0.5 ·U(d+ ε,0,C−d− ε)+0.5 ·U(0,d+ ε,C−d− ε).
Hence, in equilibrium, non-prohibitive demands have to satisfy d j,dk = 0, and as
shown above, this implies the proposer payoff C.
It remains to show that equilibrium demands are non-prohibitive regardless of the
identity of the proposer. Assume the opposite, and fix proposer i such that demanders
j,k are best off making prohibitive demands (as long as the other one does so). Thus
U(d′,C−d′,0)≤min{u˜ j, u˜k} for d′ : U(C−d′,d′,0) = u˜i (5)
with d′ as the highest demand that i considers non-prohibitive (which follows from
the definition of “prohibitive” demands, see above). Let (x˜i, x˜ j, x˜k) denote the “con-
tinuation” payoffs in the SSPE (i.e. the expected payoffs in case the first round ends
in disagreement). By weak concavity of U , u˜i ≤U(x˜i, x˜ j, x˜k), and by definition of the
game x˜i+ x˜ j + x˜k ≤C. Without loss, assume u˜ j ≤ u˜k. Thus, (5) implies
U(d′,C−d′,0)≤ u˜ j ≤U(x˜ j, x˜i, x˜k) or U(C−d′,d′,0)≤ u˜i ≤U(x˜i, x˜ j, x˜k).
for all d′ ∈ [0,C], and thus x˜k = 0 under quasi-linearity. Since the payoffs are bounded
below by zero in all subgames, x˜k = 0 implies that k’s payoff is zero in all subgames,
and since U(0,d,C−d)<U(d,0,C−d), this implies u˜k < u˜ j, the contradiction.
Thus, the equilibrium prediction is independent of whether players are egoistic,
linearly inequity averse, or linearly altruistic, and it is equally extreme in all cases.
Further, preferences for social efficiency are compatible with quasi-linearity, too, as
all allocations induce the same sum of payoffs, namely C. Therefore, equilibrium
demands are positive only if preferences are non-linear. The best known example of
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non-linear social preferences is the CES family of distributive preferences, i.e.
U(xi,x−i) =
(
(1−α) · (1+ xi)β+α/2 · (1+ x j)β+α/2 · (1+ xk)β
)1/β
(6)
with α ∈ [0,0.5] as the degree of altruism and s = 1/(1−β) as the elasticity of sub-
stitution. We assume β ∈ (−∞,1] to ensure concavity.
Without linearity, the donation to the third player may be positive, although any
such donation is strategically irrelevant. For every utility function U , there exists a
value e∗ ≥ 0 and function e(d) ≥ 0 such that if the demands are (d1,d2) with e∗ ≤
d1 < d2, the proposer gives d1 to pay the player with the lower demand, and he gives
e(d1) to the other. For all d ∈ (0,C), e(d) is
e(d) ∈ argmax
e′∈[0,C−d]
U(C−d− e′,d,e′). (7)
Under continuity and weak concavity, e is unique. In the case of CES preferences,
e(d) = max
{
0,
(1−α)1/(β−1)
(α/2)1/(β−1)+(1−α)1/(β−1) · (C+2−d)−1
}
, (8)
results. That is, e(d) is continuous and decreasing in d, and by definition it is non-
negative and bounded. Thus it has a unique fixed point in [0,C] which we will denote
as e∗. Our next result shows that the equilibrium demands are d = e∗, possibly pos-
itive, if e(d) is continuous and weakly decreasing in d. As shown, this assumption
covers CES preferences, but in fact, it is rather general and covers all non-linear forms
of social preferences assumed in the literature (that we are aware of).1
Proposition 2 (Non-linear preferences). Assume U is strictly concave in (xi,x j,xk)
and implies that e as defined in (7) is continuous and weakly decreasing in d. There
exists e∗ such that in all stationary SPEs, the equilibrium demands (d j,dk) satisfy
max{d j,dk} ≤ e∗ in all subgames, and the proposer payoff is C−2e∗.
Remark 3. There is a plethora of payoff equivalent and interchangeable equilibria.
In all cases where at least one player demands e∗ or less, the proposer allocates e∗ to
both—out of “altruism” he does not give less in this case, even if both demand less
1It is possible to define social preferences that violate the assumption that e(d) is weakly decreas-
ing, however. Nested CES preferences are one example. Such functions are not used in the literature.
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than e∗.
Remark 4. In this non-linear case, strict concavity of U is assumed to ensure unique-
ness of the optimal proposals in all cases (i.e. in response to all demand vectors) and
to establish non-prohibitiveness of demands. In the quasi-linear case, weak concavity
is sufficient for both, as corner solutions arise in all cases.
Proof. Fix an SSPE and let (u˜1, u˜2, u˜3) denote the continuation utilities (as above).
Define e∗ as the unique fixed point of e in [0,C]. In response to demands (d j,dk), the
optimal proposal takes the form
(
C−d− e(d),d,e(d)) if min{d j,dk} =: d ≥ e∗ (by
the definition of e), or it takes the form
(
C−2e∗,e∗,e∗) if min{d j,dk}=: d ≤ e∗ (by
definition of e and strict concavity of U). Demands (d j,dk) are called “prohibitive” if
the respective optimal proposer utility is less than his continuation utility u˜i.
Now, consider a subgame where the players make non-prohibitive demands in
the fixed SSPE and let (d j,dk) denote these demands. We claim max{d j,dk} ≤ e∗,
and for contradiction, assume the opposite. First, consider the case d j = dk. By
condition (2), d j > e∗ and the assumption e be decreasing in d,
U
(
d j,e(d j),C−d j− e(d j)
)
>U
(
e(d j),d j,C−d j− e(d j)
)
, (9)
and thus continuity of U implies that there exists ε> 0 such that
U
(
d j− ε,e(d j− ε),C−d j− ε− e(d j− ε)
)
> 0.5 ·U(d j,e(d j),C−d j− e(d j))+0.5 ·U(e(d j),d j,C−d j− e(d j)).
Hence, j benefits by unilaterally deviating to d′ = d j− ε. Second, consider the case
d j 6= dk; without loss, assume d j < dk. Now (9) and continuity implies that there
exists ε> 0 such that
U
(
d j− ε,e(d j− ε),C−d j− ε− e(d j− ε)
)
>U
(
e(d j),d j,C−d j− e(d j)
)
.
Hence, k benefits by unilaterally deviating to d′ = d j− ε.
Finally, non-prohibitiveness of equilibrium demands follows from concavity of
U and can be established as follows. Similar to above, the opposite implies (under
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concavity) that for all d′ ∈ [e∗,C]
U(d′,C−d′− e(d′),e(d′))≤ u˜ j ≤U(x˜ j, x˜i, x˜k)
or U(C−d′− e(d′),d′,e(d′))≤ u˜i ≤U(x˜i, x˜ j, x˜k),
again using (x˜ j, x˜i, x˜k) to denote the continuation payoffs. Set d′ such that U(C−d′−
e(d′),d′,e(d′))=U(x˜i, x˜ j, x˜k). By concavity, U(d′,C−d′−e(d′),e(d′))≥U(x˜ j, x˜i, x˜k)
follows, and equality obtains only if x˜ j = d′, x˜i = C− d′− e(d′), x˜ j = e(d′), but by
δ= 0.95 < 1, x˜i+ x˜ j + x˜k <C, the contradiction.
Thus, non-linear preferences can explain positive donations to the third player.
For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case β→ 0, sufficiently high altruism (α = 0.3)
implies values of e(d) ∈ [3,4] and a fixed point e∗ ≈ 4. Higher demands can be
explained by assuming higher degrees of altruism or lower elasticity of substitution,
but in any case, the equilibrium demands are competitive and equate with e∗. In turn,
combinations of high demands d and moderate donations e(d) to the third player
cannot be explained by social preference theory. In particular, the following is implied
under either of the above assumptions.
Corollary 5 (Concave utilities). If the equilibrium demands are d and the proposer
makes a proposal of the form (C−d− e,d,e), then e = d.
3 The experiment
The experimental game is exactly as described in the previous section. The experi-
ment was computerized (using z-Tree, see Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the
experimental economics laboratory in a German university. Subjects were students
from various faculties, recruited via a mass email announcement of the experiment.
There was a total of five sessions. Each session was partitioned into two sub-sessions,
to each six subjects were randomly assigned. Subjects never interacted with those
from other sub-sessions. Sessions were partitioned to increase the number of in-
dependent observations, and ran simultaneously to increase the sense of anonymity.
Each session contained 12 subjects. A total of 60 subjects participated. Each subject
was allowed to participate only once.
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Each session comprised 10 repetitions (“stages”) of the game, each comprising
a number of “rounds.” In each stage, subjects were randomly re-matched into groups
of three. Roles were randomly reassigned in each round. Neutral language was used.
Subjects were randomly assigned partitioned computer terminals that enforced pri-
vacy. They read experimental instructions and answered a control questionnaire for
us to check their understanding. At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed
of their payments, and anonymously collected their payments from a third party one
week after the experiment. Payments included ae 4 participation fee and the earnings
from one randomly chosen “winning stage” ranging frome 0 toe 24 per subject. The
average pay-out per subject was e 11.12 for, on average, less than 1 hour per session.
4 Results
Table 1 lists the mean demands and proposals in all rounds, and Figure 1 provides a
graphical overview of demands, proposals, and proposals in relation to demands. The
proposals x ∈ X are stated in response to a profile (d1,d2) of demands. The lower of
the two demands dl =min{d1,d2} is strategically relevant for the proposer (assuming
dl ≤ 16.40), while the higher one dh = max{d1,d2} is strategically irrelevant. Our
analysis therefore focuses on (dl,dh) rather than (d1,d2). Using this notation, the
theoretically predicted proposals under quasi-linear preferences are xp = 24− dl to
the proposer, xl = dl to the party with the lower demand, and xh ≈ 0 to the other.
Figure 1f shows the distribution of demands. Mode and median are at 8, which
is the ex ante expected payoff, and the mean is 8.78 with standard deviation 3.05.
Table 1a suggests that demands initially decline notably but they fluctuate largely
above eight. To investigate this rigorously, we econometrically estimate the demand
strategies next, controlling for interdependence (via two-level random effects, on Ses-
sion and Subject in Session), reciprocal of game number (= 1/G, to be able to gauge
convergence for G→∞), and round number minus 1 (= R).2 The demand estimate is
xd = 8.3479∗∗
(0.3095)
+1.6346∗∗
(0.4168)
·G−1−0.1092
(0.1639)
·R. (10)
For G→ ∞, the demand converges to the intercept 8.348, as suggested by Table 1a.
2Significance at the 5% level is denoted by ∗ and significance at the 1% level by ∗∗.
11
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of demands proposals
(a) Demands in rounds 1–10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9.758
(3.326)
9.395
(3.094)
9.208
(2.902)
8.369
(2.883)
8.342
(3.696)
9.104
(3.916)
8.679
(2.472)
8.372
(2.383)
7.764
(2.203)
8.649
(2.954)
(b) Proposals in rounds 1–10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
xp 11.04
(3.624)
12.2
(3.844)
12.42
(3.823)
11.37
(4.877)
12.53
(4.03)
13.7
(4.60)
11.16
(4.849)
12.9
(3.939)
13.44
(4.041)
14.17
(3.461)
xl 7.776
(1.351)
7.4
(1.675)
7.211
(2.589)
8.375
(4.645)
7.005
(2.859)
6.755
(3.343)
7.475
(0.925)
7.4
(1.401)
5.915
(2.492)
6.729
(2.157)
xh 5.185
(3.444)
4.4
(3.982)
4.368
(4.099)
4.25
(3.767)
4.46
(3.444)
3.545
(4.538)
5.37
(4.651)
3.7
(3.816)
4.65
(3.675)
3.105
(3.776)
Note: xp is the payoff that the proposer allocates to himself, xl is the payoff of the player with the low
demand dl ∈min{d1,d2}, and xh is the payoff of the player with the high demand dh ∈max{d1,d2}.
Result 1 (Demands). Demands do not violate stationarity (as R is insignificant), but
they are not competitive and the mean demand converges to above eight—much in
excess of theoretical predictions, indicating the lack of ultimata competition.
To understand the lack of convergence of demands, let us now look at the pro-
posals. We focus on final proposals, i.e. those that satisfied at least one demand, as
the other proposals are strategically uninformative.3 Table 1b provides the proposal
means, distinguishing between xl (the payoff of the player with the low demand dl)
and xh (the payoff of the player with the high demand dh). Wilcoxon tests confirm
xp > xl and xl > xh (p ≈ 0 in both cases). Figure 1g plots the proposals in rela-
tion to lower demand and higher demand, respectively. The diagonal xl = dl is lined
with observations, implying proposers strategically match lower demands, while non-
strategic donations to the player with the higher demand are less systematic.
As above, we estimate the proposal function econometrically, controlling for G,
R, dl , dh, and two-level random effects. In estimating xh, we add xl to test for substi-
tution effects (the econometric equivalent of e(d) as defined above).
3Most proposals were final and therefore informative, however; 163/200 of the games actually
ended in the first round, 35/200 ended in a later round, and 2/200 games ended in disagreement.
12
Figure 1: Further information on the distribution of proposals
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Note: The points are slightly perturbed, and the proposals that satisfied neither demand are ex-
cluded.
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xp = 16.088∗∗
(1.0821)
−2.1635∗∗
(0.8556)
·G−1−0.3478
(0.3369)
·R−0.4801∗∗
(0.1295)
·dl +0.0617
(0.0831)
·dh
xl = 0.6523
(0.6176)
+0.2592
(0.5451)
·G−1 +0.0866
(0.2114)
·R+0.6871∗∗
(0.0789)
·dl +0.1533∗∗
(0.0509)
·dh
xh = 7.6161∗∗
(1.0443)
+1.9548∗
(0.8244)
·G−1 +0.2684
(0.3247)
·R+0.1774
(0.1438)
·dl −0.1526
(0.0828)
·dh −0.5226∗∗
(0.1133)
· xl
First, look at the projected limits of the proposals as G tends to infinity. Given that
the demands stabilize around 8.35, xp stabilizes at 12.60 (= 16.088− 0.48 ∗ 8.35+
0.0617∗8.35), the proposal to the low demanding player xl stabilizes at 7.67, and the
proposal to the high demanding one stabilizes at 3.82 (note that these numbers almost
exactly add up to 24, which underlines their credibility). That is, the offers to the
high demanders are not only significant during the experiment, but there is not even a
clear trend suggesting that they will decrease notably below the level observed in the
experiment (see also xh in Table 1b). The observed limit of 3.82 is compatible with
Cobb-Douglas altruism, as discussed above, but not with quasi-linear utilities such as
linear altruism or inequity aversion.
Result 2 (Proposals). Proposers get the lion’s share, lower demands are strategically
satisfied, but non-strategic offers to the high demanders are far higher than predicted
and decrease hardly as subjects gain experience.
The previous two results indicate that preferences are not quasi-linear as assumed
by Proposition 1. Proposition may apply, however. To verify this, look at how the
payoffs change if the low demand dl decreases by e 1. The proposer payoff increases
only by e 0.48, and the low-demanding player’s payoff does not decrease by a full
e 1, but only by e 0.68. The difference e 0.20 actually goes to the third player,
the high demander (note the interaction with decreasing xl , i.e. dxh/ddl = 0.177−
0.553∗0.687 =−0.203). In turn, if the low demand increases, then the non-strategic
donation to the high demander decreases by 20%. Qualitatively, this observation is
compatible with CES preferences, and in particular with the comparative statics of
e(d) as defined above.
Result 3 (Assumptions of Proposition 2 are satisfied). The payment to the low deman-
der indeed approximates d, the lesser of the two demands. The donation e to the high
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demander is highly volatile and most frequently zero. However, positive donations
occur, and empirically e is highly significantly decreasing in d.
Finally, if the high demand increases, then both the proposer payoff and the low
demander’s payoff increase, while the high demander’s payoff decreases (by about
22% of his demand increase)—although the high demand (as well as its increase) is
strategically irrelevant. In this way, the proposer punishes greedy demands. In turn, if
the high demand decreases, then the payoff of the high demander increases by 22%.
Thus, the following result.
Result 4 (Non-competitive demands). There is no empirical benefit from being the
high demander, as xl < xh is highly significant, and being the high demander, one
should decrease the demand.
The central observation is the discrepancy between the Results 3, which confirms
that the assumptions of the theoretical analysis are correct, and 4, there is indeed no
benefit to being the high demander, to the Result 1, subjects are very reluctant to
decrease demands below eight. See also Table 1a and the econometric estimate Eq.
(10), which indicates convergence toward 8.35.
Thus, while the assumptions of the theory are not violated empirically, the log-
ical conclusion derived under the assumption of concavity, Corollary 5 (competitive
demands), is clearly violated. The discrepancy seems actually quite large. Demands
stay at e 8, the payoff to the third player tends to be below e 4.
One possible explanation for this is that decreasing the demand below eight does
not imply empirically that one will be the low demander with probability 1. Aggre-
gated over all rounds, the probability of winning with the demand d = 8.1 is 0.388,
the probability of winning with d = 8.0 is 0.547, and the probability of winning with
d = 7.9 is 0.717 (all, assuming ties are resolved by uniform draws). Thus, the prob-
ability of winning does increase substantially. Given this, players with CES prefer-
ences that are compatible with a e 4 donation to the third player (e.g. α= 0.4 or less,
and β = −0.2 or higher) are strictly best off undercutting demands of 8. Assuming
the high demander gets e 4, the expected utility (for α = 0.4 and β = −0.2) from
demanding d = 8 is 7.70, and the expected utility from demanding d = 7.9 is 7.96. In
fact, the expected utility from demanding d = 7 (EU = 7.82) is still higher than that
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from demanding 8. The relations are similar for other utility parameters, and overall
we infer from the reluctance to demand eight that concavity is not satisfied.
Result 5 (Concavity violated). Subjects’ utilities are not concave in the payoff profile.
Since social preferences are generally represented by concave utility functions,
we conclude that social preferences do not explain fair demands and donations in this
case.
5 Reference dependence
Technically, the failure of concave utilities to explain the observations lies in the fact
that they imply diminishing marginal returns. If utility is concave in the payoffs,
then the decrease of utility from getting xi = 8 to getting xi = 7 is smaller than the
decrease in utility when the payoff declines from 7 to 6, from 6 to 5, or even from 5
to 4. Hence, players should accept taking the loss from 8 to 7 in order to reduce the
risk of dropping down to 4. Apparently, the subjects think differently.
They seem to consider the drop from 8 to 7 to be worse than the drop from say 5
to 4. Thus, in this region the utility function seems to be convex, violating diminishing
marginal returns. This suggests that subjects’ utilities have the well-known S-shape
proposed by the Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the loss region,
utility is convex, and only in the gain region, it is concave. This corresponds with
a reference point of 8, i.e. that payoffs below 8 induce a loss, and payoffs above 8
are counted as gain. This reference point is reasonable in this context, as the fair
share is easy to compute (24/3 = 8), it equates with the ex-ante equilibrium payoffs
(the reference point proposed by Shalev, 2000, 2002, and Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006,
2007), and it also appeals to a sense of fairness, although in a different way than social
preferences. The corresponding utility function is
U(xi,x j,xk) =
{
(xi−8)α, if xi ≥ 8
−β · (8− xi)α, if xi < 8.
(11)
Now, if the utility is steep enough around the reference point 8, i.e. if α is low enough,
then undercutting demands of 8 does not pay off. Theoretically, this obtains only in
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the limiting case α→ 0, but practically, the noisiness of demands implies that reason-
able α are sufficient to explain the reluctance. Given our data, α< 0.4 is empirically
sufficient. With the same numbers as those used above (for CES preferences), de-
manding d = 8 induces the expected utility (using α= 0.38 and β= 2.25) of−1.726,
demanding d = 7.9 induces −1.769, demanding d = 7.8 induces −1.957, and further
decreases of the demand induce further decreases of the expected utility. Thus, the
mode demand d = 8 is compatible with reference dependence.
Result 6 (Reference dependent demands). The demands are compatible with refer-
ence dependent preferences if α< 0.4.
This raises the question whether the empirical donations e to the third player
fit into this picture. As summarized in Result 3, the donation e is volatile, has the
mode at zero, and it is decreasing in d (see also Figures 1g and 1c). The mode at
zero and the high volatility suggest that subjects actually play logit response for e (or
more generally, have random utility) rather than best responses and that the utility
maximizing choice is e = 0. In turn, the observations are not compatible with social
preferences even after accounting for quantal response. For, if the utility maximizing
choice would be some e > 0, then under the standard assumption of i.i.d. logistic
errors, the mode should be e> 0 (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998, and Turocy, 2010,
for quantal response equilibria in extensive-form games, and Breitmoser et al., 2010,
for QREs in dynamic games such as the one considered here).
Finally, the conjunction of reference dependence and logistic errors also explains
the observation that e is decreasing in d. The larger d, the smaller is the proposer
payoff C−d−e (keeping e constant), and in particular, the closer the proposer payoff
is to his reference point of 8. Thus, the proposer’s utility is comparably steep if d is
high, which implies that he is less likely to choose high e. In turn, if d is low, then the
proposer payoff is rather high, his utility is rather flat in e, and thus he is more likely
to choose high e under logistic errors. Note that this effect is more pronounced if the
curvature if U is strong, i.e. if α is low, which corresponds with the above explanation
for the demands.
Result 7 (Reference dependent offers). The donations e to the third player are com-
patible with reference dependence (in particular for low α) and logistic errors.
Thus, we conclude that “fair” demands and “generous” donations, which are
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incompatible with social preferences, are compatible with reference dependent pref-
erences.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We theoretically and experimentally analyzed the ultimata bargaining, where a cake
worth e 24 is to be divided. First, two of the three players state demands, and in
response the proposer has to propose an allocation satisfying at least one demand. The
observed demands stabilized around e 8, the payoff allocated to the low demander
was approximately equal to his demand (i.e. e 8), and the average payoff to the high
demander was e 4. These results are incompatible with social preferences, which
are restricted from manifesting as generosity by construct of our game. The results
are, however, compatible with reference dependent preferences taking the ex ante
expected payoffs, which coincide with the equal split, as reference point.
Like in the three-player bargaining game of Kagel and Wolfe (2001), we find
a lack of support for fairness theories in three-player bargaining games. We went
further by seeking for an explanation for generosity in an environment where social
preferences have no bite. Our results support the argument put forth by a line of
recent work emphasizing the role of reference dependence in social behavior (see e.g.
Neilson, 2006, Dana et al., 2006, 2007). Indeed, the role of ex ante expected payoffs
as endogenous reference points is implied by the results of Knez and Camerer (1995).
Our paper also shows how an imbalance of strategic power in theory does not
necessarily translate to asymmetric welfare distributions in the practice. Such un-
derstanding is important, because it can be used to inform choices of group decision
procedures, for example. Montero et al. (2008) studied the effect of varying voting
weights and rules on strategic power with a voting game following Brams and Af-
fuso (1976). In one of their treatments, one player had a strategic advantage over
others. The cake was split unevenly within the minimum winning coalition, with
the advantaged player earning the most, while equal splits within the minimum win-
ning coalition were observed with symmetric power. We analyzed a game where a
far more extreme imbalance of strategic power and welfare distribution results from
self-interest or social preferences. Experimental outcomes were not as grim as theo-
retically expected, as we observed welfare being distributed amongst all three players.
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The ultimata that we observed were not as competitive as predicted, reminiscent
to Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)’s experimental observation that price competition
was not as fierce as expected in their two-firm Bertrand competition game—an ef-
fect which diminished with the increase in the number of firms. They posited that
beliefs of “crazy” opponents can induce non-competitive equilibria in markets with
sufficiently few firms. Similarly, we also consider the role of bounded rationality,
namely in terms of logistic errors. Ultimatum competition differs from price compe-
tition, however, in that the earnings of non-proposers depend not only on each others’
demands but also on the choice of a human proposer—setting the strategic context for
social preferences that we are specifically interested in.4 Moreover, collusion between
non-proposers in ultimatum competition seems generally implausible considering the
results of Güth et al. (1996), who find of opportunism between “fellow” responders.
Like in other experiments on majority bargaining games, such as by Fréchette
et al. (2005), who studied a sequential move demand bargaining game of Morelli
(1999) and the random proposer game of Baron (1989), and by Drouvelis et al. (2010)
who studied the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) game, we observed the under-realization
of proposer power in our simultaneous move ultimata game. While social preferences
such as inequity aversion increases inequity in the Baron-Ferejohn game (Montero,
2007), the equilibrium prediction in our game is, relative to self-interest predictions,
largely invariant to social preferences. This imposes a control for social preferences
and allowed us to tease out the motives for generosity beyond social preferences.
Proposers were observed to be strategically accommodating yet non-strategically
generous, satisfying the lower of the two demands while leaving something for the
other party. Prompted by the findings indicating the role that the fear of rejection
plays in motivating generosity (Croson, 1996; Güth and van Damme, 1998; Kagel
et al., 1996; Straub and Murnighan, 1995), the ultimata game allows demands to be
observed prior to proposing, thereby insulating the proposer from the risk of rejec-
tion. Indeed, we found evidence for strategic concerns in the matching of lower of
demands, and yet, generosity toward the third player was significant.
Our results clearly show that generosity can exist in an environment without
social preferences. Camerer (2003) postulated that offers in ultimatum games are
4In their game the winner takes it all, and profits are equally shared if bids are tied, whereas here
non-coalitional parties in our game can benefit from the generosity of proposers.
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strategically made to avoid rejection, and those in dictator games are driven by con-
cerns for the strategically powerless receiver. These two experimental workhorses
are juxtaposed, strategically and endogenously, in the single context of our game.
Uncannily, we observed strategic offers and demands comparable to the minimum
acceptable offers found in standard ultimatum games and non-strategic offers close
to dictator donations (for a survey see Camerer, 2003). If we accept the notion that
preferences are context-dependent, then our observations may be explained by a story
of mixed motives. Alternatively, a parsimonious explanation is afforded by the model
of reference dependence.
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A Experimental instructions and screen shots
Note: the original instructions are in German and are available on request.
Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is divided
into 10 stages. In each stage, the computer will assign you to one of four groups, with
three participants per group (including you). After each stage, you will be reassigned
to a new group. You are paid based on a randomly chosen winning stage. You will get
your earnings in Euros. Additionally, you get 4 Euros independently of your actions.
Your task In each stage, 24 Euros are to be allocated. First, a participant will be
assigned the A role and the other two participants will be assigned the B role. These
assignments are random, and all group members have the same probability of being
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assigned the A role. Next, the B participants state how much of the 24 Euros to claim
for themselves. The A participant subsequently proposes a division of the 24 Euros.
If the claim of at least one B participant is satisfied, then the proposed division is
implemented, and the stage ends. If no B participant’s claim is satisfied, then
• with 95% probability, a new round begins, where one of the participants will be
randomly assigned the A role again, and
• with 5% probability, the current stage ends. In this case, all participants get 0
Euro for this stage.
General In each stage, the three members of a group are referred to as Participant
1, Participant 2, and Participant 3. The numbering is done randomly when a new
group is formed (i.e. at the beginning of each stage). Consequently, it may happen
that you are referred to as Participant 3 in one stage and as Participant 1 in another
stage. The numbering is held constant for the duration of a stage. The assignment
to A and B roles is independent of the numbering, i.e. in the first round of a stage,
participant 2 could be assigned the A role, and in a possible second round, it could
be participant 3. It may also happen that one participant is assigned the A role in
two or more consecutive rounds (while many consecutive assignments are relatively
unlikely).
Numbers have to be entered at two points: when B participants state their claims,
and when the A participant proposes a division. The claims cannot be less than 0
Euro and not greater than 24 Euros. These bounds and all values in between are
legitimate claims, including fractional numbers such as “0.80” (= 0 Euro and 80
Cents). Fractions of Cents cannot be claimed. As for division proposals, the same
rules apply. No participant can be allocated less than 0 Euro, none more than 24
Euros, and combined no more than 24 Euros can be allocated. It is not necessary that
all 24 Euros are allocated.
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Figure 2: Screen shots
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